The term “subject to contract” is a well-known phrase in ordinary legal parlance and used daily by parties when seeking to compromise disputes. Still, in the recent case of Joanne Properties Ltd v Moneything Capital Ltd [2020] EWCA Civ 154, the Court of Appeal was required to reassess the scope and effect of this commonly used phrase, and whether or not there can be a legally binding agreement where this qualification has been used during the course of negotiations.

On the facts of the case, Joanne Properties Ltd (the Appellant) borrowed money from Moneything Capital Ltd (the Respondent), secured by a legal charge over a property in Wandsworth. When the Appellant fell into arrears, it challenged the Respondent’s appointment of LPA receivers on the ground that both the loan agreement and charge had been procured by undue influence. The Appellant then applied to the court to set aside both the agreement and the charge, and claimed injunctive relief against the receivers preventing them from taking any steps to realise the security.

The parties were able to compromise the injunction application, agreeing that the property should be sold, with an order for distribution of the proceeds of sale. The issue on appeal was whether the parties had reached a further binding contract of compromise about how the ring-fenced sum of £140,000, after repayment of the sale costs and the loan capital, was to be shared between them.

In allowing the appeal, Lord Justice Lewison provided a useful review of the origins of the “subject to contract” formula and the reasons behind it. Put simply, the effect of these words mean that neither party intends to be legally bound unless and until a formal contract is executed, and that each party therefore reserves the right to withdraw from any proposed agreement until such time as a binding contract is made. This allows the parties to see at once whether there is a contract, or whether they are still in the negotiation stage. The court reminded itself that without this principle there would be a great deal of uncertainty in law in respect of those agreements that have been fully concluded and those that have not.

The court went on to acknowledge that even where negotiations have begun "subject to contract", the parties may waive this qualification, but only if they both expressly agree that it should be expunged or if such an agreement was to be necessarily implied. The mere fact that parties get close to a contract or are of one mind is not, in itself, sufficient to create a legally binding agreement. There must be either a formal contract in place, or a clear factual basis for inferring that the parties must have intended to waive the qualification. In the case before the court there was neither.

On its' facts, both the alleged offer and acceptance were each headed "subject to contract”, and the parties also plainly contemplated that a consent order would be needed in order to embody the compromise, just as the earlier settlement agreement had been embodied in a formal signed contract. All that had happened here was that correspondence had been exchanged, and even though there had been an agreement in principal, this was not enough to be enforceable.

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